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Abstract
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic
uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that
players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and choose their strategies independently.
I show that an essential condition for Bayesian rationality is violated in every game with
imperfect information. Moreover, without strategic uncertainty, players cannot choose their
strategies independently. This means strategic independence requires strategic uncertainty. If
we distinguish between strategic certainty and uncertainty, we are able to explain both the
existence of the cooperative and the noncooperative solution of the prisoner’s dilemma.
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“The logical roots of game theory are in Bayesian decision theory. Indeed, game
theory can be viewed as an extension of decision theory (to the case of two or more
decision-makers), or as its essential logical fulfillment. Thus, to understand the
fundamental ideas of game theory, one should begin by studying decision theory.”
Myerson (1991, p. 5)
1. Bayesian Rationality in Games
T
HIS note builds on the foundations of subjectivistic decision theory, i.e., of rational choice
under uncertainty. Thus, it seems worth recapitulating the basic theory, before going
into the details. This section presents typical assumptions about (i) the structure of the
decision problem, (ii) the consistency of the decision maker’s preferences, and (iii) his behavior
or—in the context of game theory—the behavior of the players. A nice overview of subjectivistic
expected-utility theories can be found in Fishburn (1981). Readers familiar with this topic must
forgive me and may skip this section.
Aumann and Dreze (2009) distinguish between games against nature and strategic games.
This suggests that the principles of rational choice hold irrespective of whether we suppose
that there is only a single decision maker faced with nature or a number of players competing
with each other in a situation of conflict. Hence, each decision maker may be considered a
player and vice versa. Further, no distinction is made between cooperative and noncooperative
strategic games, since every “noncooperative” game can lead to cooperation—and thus turn
into a “cooperative” game—if this is in the interests of each player (Selten, 2001). This means
cooperation is viewed as a possible result but not as a prerequisite of a strategic game.
1.1. Games against Nature
The following exposition is based on Fishburn (1981) and Savage (1954). The state space of
the decision problem is denoted byΩ. It is assumed thatΩ is nonempty. Each element ω ∈Ω
represents a state of nature or state of the world. LetF be a nonempty set of subsets ofΩ such
thatΩ ∈F , F ∈F ⇒Ω\ F ∈F , and F1,F2, . . . ∈F ⇒⋃i∈NFi ∈F . Hence,F is a σ-algebra and
each element ofF is referred to as an event. The event F ∈F is said to happen if and only if some
state ω ∈ F obtains. The tuple (Ω,F ) represents a measurable space. A function p :F → [0,1]
is said to be a probability measure if and only if p(Ω) = 1 and p(⋃i∈NFi ) =∑i∈N p(Fi ) for all
mutually disjoint events F1,F2, . . . ∈F . It is supposed that the decision maker has a subjective
probability measure p, i.e., a prior, so that p(F ) represents his prior probability of F ∈F . This
leads to a probability space (Ω,F , p). Moreover, there exists a nonempty setN of null events,
which consists of all F ∈F with p(F )= 0. The decision maker does not believe that any event
F ∈N will happen and thus he may ignore every null event. The null events are called negligible,
whereas each event F ∈F \N is said to be substantial.
Fishburn (1981, p. 141) notes that, “states [. . . ] lead to specific consequences that depend on
the course of action adopted by the individual.” In addition, he writes that, “[. . . ] the occurrence
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of one consequence precludes the occurrence of any other consequence.” Thus, consider a
nonempty set C of consequences. Throughout this work, it is assumed that C is a subset of Rn
with n ∈N. Let CΩ be the set of allF -measurable functions fromΩ to C . The decision maker
chooses a certain action, which leads to one and only one s ∈CΩ, whereas each state of nature,
ω, leads to a specific consequence s(ω) ∈C . According to Savage (1954, Chapter 2.5), “If two
different acts had the same consequences in every state of the world, there would [. . . ] be no
point in considering them two different acts at all.” This means in a game against nature it is not
necessary to distinguish between the action of the decision maker and the associated element
of CΩ. Hence, we may call each element of CΩ a Savage act (Fishburn, 1981, p. 143,160).
Savage (1954, p. 15) treats an important aspect of his subjectivistic approach to rational choice:
“The argument might be raised that the formal description of decision [. . . ] seems
inadequate because a person may not know the consequences of the acts open to
him in each state of the world.”
Savage argues that it should always be possible to cut each element of Ω into pieces, i.e., to
dissect every potential source of uncertainty, until every state of nature, ω, leads to one and
only one consequence s(ω).1 The Savage act, s, may depend on the decision, but once the
action of the decision maker and the state of nature, ω, are fixed, the decision maker cannot be
uncertain about s(ω). This means he might not knowω, but if somebody tells himω, he certainly
knows s(ω), i.e., the consequence of his decision that occurs if ω ∈Ω obtains. This fundamental
assumption can be made even more precise as follows:
(i) The state space, Ω, is properly specified. This means the decision maker has a unique
conjecture about the potential consequences of each possible action.
(ii) His conjectures are always correct, i.e., he knows the potential consequences.
The above distinction between belief and knowledge seems to be of minor importance in games
against nature, but it turns out to be essential when we discuss strategic games.
Similar arguments hold for the set of possible actions. Since the actions are mutually exclusive,
the action set of the decision maker should contain every available policy. For example, if we
consider a game against nature in its extensive form, where one decision can lead to another,
we should take all sequential decision rules into account that can be adopted by the player.
Nonetheless, in the normal form of the game, there is no time dimension and thus, at least in a
formal sense, actions and consequences cannot be associated with any point in time.
The observation that s must be uniquely determined by the action of the decision maker
might seem trivial prima facie, but the devil is in the details. The Savage act s is an element of
CΩ, i.e., the set of allF -measurable functions fromΩ to C ⊆Rn . Moreover, the decision maker’s
prior, p, forms a quotient space of CΩ, i.e., a set of equivalence classes. This means two elements
of CΩ belong to the same equivalence class, i.e., are considered identical by the decision maker,
if and only if they are almost surely equal. Here, the notion of “almost surely” essentially depends
1See the omelet example in Savage (1954, pp. 13–15).
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on p. For example, consider two Savage acts s, t ∈CΩ and suppose that there are two players
with different priors. Then the Savage acts s and t could be identical from the perspective of
Player 1. This means s and t differ only with respect to those events that are negligible for Player
1. By contrast, the Savage acts s and t might be different for Player 2 because they differ at least
with respect to one event that is substantial from his point of view. Hence, the L0 space of the
decision maker essentially depends on his individual prior.
It is assumed that the decision maker has a measurable utility function u : R→R such that
E
(
u(s)
)
:=
∫
Ω
u
(
s(ω)
)
p(dω)<∞
for all s ∈CΩ. The Savage act s is preferred to t , i.e., s Â t , if and only if E(u(s))> E(u(t )). Hence,
the utility function u induces an asymmetric weak order Â on CΩ, i.e., Â is a strict preference
relation such that s Â t ⇒¬(t Â s) and r Â t ⇒ (r Â s ∨ s Â t) for all r, s, t ∈ CΩ. It can easily
be extended to a weak order º (Fishburn, 1981, p. 145). Now, let S be a nonempty subset of
CΩ. This may be seen as the set of Savage acts that are available to the decision maker. He is
considered rational if and only if he chooses an optimal act s∗ ∈S . This means there must be
no other Savage act s ∈S such that E(u(s))> E(u(s∗)). This represents a behavioral assumption
of rational choice—besides our given assumptions about structure and consistency.
So far we have assumed that the prior, p, and the utility function, u, are given. Hence, the
preference relation Â has been obtained as a result of p and u. Subjectivistic decision theory
usually goes the other way around (de Finetti, 1937, Fishburn, 1981, Ramsey, 1931, Savage, 1954).
This means one starts with some structural assumptions and basic requirements regarding the
consistency of some given preference relation. Then he shows that the given preferences can
be represented by a subjective probability measure p and a utility function u (Fishburn, 1981).
Hence, a rational decision maker acts as if he would maximize his subjective expected utility.
Put another way, we only pretend that he knows his prior, utility function, and the available
Savage acts, but we do not require that the decision maker calculates his expected utility de facto.
This means the subjectivistic approach does not try to explain how a rational decision maker
comes to his conclusions, but it claims that his choice is always rational (for whatever reasons)
in the specific sense of the theory. This point is mentioned because it seems to be helpful for
understanding the particular approach to strategic conflict chosen by Aumann (1987).
In the Bayesian framework, the decision maker is equipped with a measurable partitionI of
Ω, i.e., a set of nonempty and mutually disjoint events whose union equals Ω. It is supposed
thatI is finite only for the sake of simplicity but without loss of generality. In the following,I
is referred to as the private information partition of the decision maker. This means he knows
which event I ∈I happens and thus considers each event F ⊆Ω\ I negligible. More precisely,
after receiving his private information, he replaces the prior, p, by the posterior p(· | I ) with
p(F | I )∝ p(I |F ) p(F ) for all F, I ∈F \N . Hence, we have that p(F | I ) = 0 for all F, I ∈F \N
with F ∩ I =;. From the decision maker’s point of view, each substantial event I ∈I leads to a
new probability space where the posterior p(·|I ) represents the subjective probability measure.
In particular, the posterior forms a new L0 space, i.e., two Savage acts s, t ∈S are considered
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identical if and only if they coincide except for the events that are negligible a posteriori.
Whenever the decision maker knows that some substantial event I ∈I happens, he chooses
a restricted Savage act sI ∈CΩ (Fishburn, 1981, p. 160).2 More precisely, sI is a Savage act that
is unique except for the p(· | I )-null events. His particular choices lead to a Savage act s ∈S
such that s(ω)= sI (ω) for each substantial event I ∈I and state of nature ω ∈Ω. It is supposed
that each Savage act s ∈S can be constructed in this way. The choice of the decision maker is
indicated by an action a ∈ A with |A| > 1. Throughout this work, it is assumed that the action set
A is a subset of R. By acting on the basis of private information, i.e., choosing an action a ∈ A for
each substantial event I ∈I , the decision maker creates a σ(I )-measurable function fromΩ to
A, where σ(I ) denotes the σ-algebra generated by his information partitionI .3 This function
is the decision maker’s strategy against nature, whereas the corresponding Savage act s can be
viewed as nature’s “strategy” against the decision maker. He considers his strategy a control
variable and nature’s strategy a state variable. This means the decision maker can deliberately
choose any strategy that can be constructed on the basis of his private information partition
and action set, but he must accept the potential consequences, i.e., the associated “response” of
nature to his strategy.
The aforementioned arguments require that sI is uniquely determined by the choice of the
decision maker on the basis of I .4 In particular, sI must not depend on a choice that is made on
the basis of another substantial event J ∈I . More precisely, since the state space is properly
specified, the decision maker has a unique conjecture about the potential consequences of his
decision. Let ψ(I , a) be the conjecture of the decision maker—given that he knows that some
substantial event I ∈I happens and chooses the action a ∈ A on the basis of I . Savage (1954,
p. 15) presumes that the decision maker is always right. Hence, for each substantial event I ∈I
and action a ∈ A, we have that ψ(I , a)= s except for the p(· | I )-null events, where s denotes the
true response of nature to the strategy of the decision maker. This basic assumption is referred
to as the Bayes condition.
Table 1 contains a game against nature, i.e., Angels & Demons, in which this condition is
violated. Here the decision maker’s payoff—given that some event I ∈I happens—does not
depend only on his choice on the basis of I ; it depends also on the decision that he would
have made otherwise. This means the response of the omniscient being—to the action, a,
that the decision maker chooses on the basis of I —is not a function of I and a in the proper
mathematical sense. I will come back to this argument when analyzing Bayesian rationality in
strategic games.
The given theoretical approach requires us to split the whole procedure of rational choice
notionally into three steps:
1. The decision maker knows that some substantial event I ∈I happens.
2. He chooses an action a ∈ A on the basis of I .
2If I is negligible, the choice of the decision maker that is based on I is negligible, too.
3This means the given function is constant over each element ofI .
4In fact, the following arguments are similar to those that have already been discussed above for the case I =Ω.
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Table 1: Angels & Demons
An omniscient being flips a coin. If the outcome is heads, he plays the role of an angel and
offers the decision maker the choice to lead either an honest or a dishonest life. The decision
maker is rewarded with a fortune if he decides to be honest and otherwise he gets nothing. If
the outcome is tails, the omniscient being reveals himself as a demon. In this case, he pays a
fortune if the decision maker decides to be dishonest, but otherwise he is left with nothing.
The omniscient being knows whether the decision maker would have decided to be honest or
dishonest in either case. Thus, if heads obtains, he pays the amount only if the decision maker
would have also decided to be honest in case of tails. Conversely, if tails obtains, the decision
maker is rewarded only if he would have also decided to be dishonest in case of heads.
3. His action leads to a restricted Savage act sI ∈CΩ.
This decomposition goes beyond the scope of probability theory. Measure theory deals with
functions that are considered to be given. This means the measure-theoretic viewpoint reflects
the situation after the decision maker has made up his mind and so it is ex post. By contrast,
here we want to analyze the procedure of rational choice, where the decision maker starts with
the first step and ends up with the third step. Hence, we must consider the situation before the
decision has been made and so the decision-theoretic viewpoint is ex ante. By distinguishing
between the different points of view we can avoid serious misunderstandings that can arise
when discussing situations of strategic conflict, which is done in the following sections.5
A decision maker is said to be Bayes rational if and only if he chooses an optimal Savage act,
given his private information, i.e., one that maximizes his conditional expected utility E
(
u(sI ) | I
)
for each substantial event I ∈ I . More precisely, his action a ∈ A must lead to a restricted
Savage act s∗I such that E
(
u(s∗I ) | I
)≥ E(u(sI ) | I ) for all Savage acts sI that are available if some
substantial event I ∈I happens. Let s∗ ∈S be the Savage act of a Bayes-rational decision maker
and s ∈S another Savage act. From the law of total expectation it follows that
E
(
u(s∗)
)= E(E(u(s∗I ) | I ))≥ E(E(u(sI ) | I ))= E(u(s)).
We conclude that every Bayes-rational decision maker is rational. Conversely, each rational
decision maker is Bayes rational. Otherwise, there would exist a substantial event I ∈I where his
action is suboptimal and so the decision maker could increase his unconditional expected utility
by substituting the suboptimal action with an optimal one. Hence, Bayesian rationality and
rationality (in the unconditional sense) are just two sides of the same coin—provided the Bayes
condition is satisfied. If this condition is violated, as it is in Angels & Demons (see Table 1), we
are no longer able to decompose an optimal strategy into a number of single decisions that may
be considered optimal on their own. In this case, Bayesian rationality is useless. Nonetheless, we
can still apply the broader concept of rationality in the unconditional sense.
5The different points of view have nothing to do with the notion of “prior” and “posterior” in Bayesian decision theory.
6
Frahm, 2016 • A Note on Bayesian Rationality and Correlated Equilibrium
1.2. Strategic Games
The following model of strategic conflict is introduced by Aumann (1987). In the subsequent
analysis, it is referred to as “Aumann’s model.” Consider a strategic game with n ∈N\{1} players
and let (Ω,F ) be the measurable space of the game.6 Each player is equipped with a prior pi ,
a utility function ui , an action set Ai ⊆R with |Ai | > 1, and a private information partitionIi
(i = 1,2, . . . ,n).7 It is assumed that the join ∨ni=1Ii , i.e., the coarsest common refinement of
I1,I2, . . . ,In , is measurable. Each player may think of as a game against nature where “nature”
is represented by the other players. Hence, from the perspective of Player i , his own strategy
is a control variable, whereas the strategy of every player j 6= i is a state variable. It is always
supposed that the strategy of Player i , si , is a σ(Ii )-measurable function from Ω to Ai . The
corresponding strategies of the other players are given by the (n−1)-tuple si .
In a game against nature, a Savage act is the argument of the utility function of the decision
maker. The same holds true in a strategic game, but there the utility of Player i depends on his
own strategy and the strategies of the other players. This means the Savage act of Player i is
not his own strategy, but it consists of the entire strategy tuple s = (si , si )≡ (s1, s2, . . . , sn). Hence,
ui (s(ω)) represents the utility of Player i , given that he applies the strategy si , the others apply
the strategies given by si , and state ω ∈Ω obtains.
According to Aumann (1987, p. 6), “The term ‘state of the world’ implies a definite specification
of all parameters that may be the object of uncertainty [. . . ].” Moreover, “Conditional on a given
ω, everybody knows everything.” Hence, the players might not know the state of the world, ω,
but if ω were revealed to them, they would certainly know each other’s action. This reflects the
decision-theoretic framework discussed in Section 1.1. However, some statements in Aumann
(1987) could lead to misunderstandings. He points out that “Nash equilibrium does make sense
if one starts by assuming that, for some specified reason, each player knows which strategies the
other players are using. But this assumption appears rather restrictive.” Further, he mentions
that “in our treatment, the players do not in general know how others are playing.” Despite
these statements, the structural assumptions that are made by Aumann suggest that every player
knows the strategies of the others.8 In Aumann’s model of strategic conflict, Player i deals with si
and si , but the latter contains nothing other than the actual strategies of his opponents. Hence,
since every player considers the same strategy tuple s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) a Savage act, at least it is
supposed that the players act as if they know each other’s strategy.
Moreover, Aumann (1987, p. 2) states that “it is common knowledge that all the players are
Bayesian utility maximizers, that they are rational in the sense that each one conforms to the
Savage theory.” In the Bayes-Savage framework we do not scrutinize the strategic reasoning of
the players. Hence, it is not necessary to assume that the rationality of the players is common
knowledge. The same holds for their priors, utility functions, information partitions, etc. In fact,
Aumann (1987, p. 10) points out that these assumptions only “aid us in understanding the model,
6In contrast to Aumann (1987), I do not presume thatΩ is finite.
7In the following, the enumeration “i = 1,2, . . . ,n” will be omitted whenever it seems clear from the context that the
corresponding statement applies to each player.
8This does not mean that anyone knows the actions of the others and so the players may have imperfect information.
7
Frahm, 2016 • A Note on Bayesian Rationality and Correlated Equilibrium
they do not affect the conclusions.” Throughout this work, we do not suppose that the players
have common knowledge—neither of their rationality nor of any other personal characteristics.
Aumann (1987, p. 2) concludes that,
“According to the Bayesian view, subjective probabilities should be assignable to
every prospect, including that of players choosing certain strategies in certain games.
Rather than playing an equilibrium, the players should simply choose strategies that
maximize their utilities given their subjective distributions over the other players’
strategy choices.”
This means strategic uncertainty can be treated like uncertainty in a game against nature.9
Put another way, it should always be possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect
information. A well-known application of this principle is Harsanyi’s (1967–1968) pioneering
work on games with incomplete information. Hence, in Aumann’s model of strategic conflict, the
players cannot suffer from strategic uncertainty, but in general they have imperfect information.
Moreover, he assumes that the players are Bayes rational. This means whenever Player i receives
some substantial information, i.e., if some event Ii ∈Ii with pi (Ii )> 0 happens, he chooses an
optimal action a∗i ∈ Ai . More precisely, a∗i is such that Ei
(
ui
(
a∗i , s
i
) | Ii ) ≥ Ei (ui (ai , si ) | Ii ) for
all ai ∈ Ai (Aumann, 1987, p. 7).10 Here, Ei (· | Ii ) denotes the conditional expectation of Player
i —given the substantial event Ii ∈Ii and individual prior pi .
The tuple
(
ai , si
)
is a restricted Savage act that Player i can choose on the basis of private
information. Here, ai represents not only an action, it is also considered a consequence of the
decision of Player i that is made on the basis of Ii ∈Ii . As in a game against nature, si might
depend on ai . More precisely, for each substantial event Ii ∈Ii and action ai ∈ Ai , Player i has
a conjecture ψi (Ii , ai ), about the strategies of the other players, which is unique except for the
pi (· | Ii )-null events. Now, the Bayes condition can be expressed as follows:
BAY. Player i is never wrong. This means we have that ψi (Ii , ai )= si for each substantial event
Ii ∈Ii and action ai ∈ Ai —except for the pi (· | Ii )-null events.
According to the notation chosen above, Aumann (1987) makes another implicit assumption:
INV. The conjectures do not depend on the actions of Player i . More precisely, we have that
ψi (Ii , a′i )=ψi (Ii , a′′i ) for each substantial event Ii ∈Ii and all actions a′i , a′′i ∈ Ai .
This invariance property is crucial for the derivation of correlated equilibrium.
Assumption BAY ∧ INV implies that no player has an influence on each other’s strategy.11
More precisely, if Player i changes his strategy, the other players maintain their strategies. This
behavioral assumption is referred to as strategic independence. It is typically justified by the
common idea that the strategy choices are independent of each other.12 However, this is not to
9This view is also held by Aumann and Dreze (2009).
10Following Section 1.1, we could also write “ai ,Ii ” and “s
i
Ii
,” but this is omitted for notational convenience.
11Player i has no influence on the event Ii ∈Ii that is going to happen. He can only control his action based upon Ii .
12I am very grateful to Andrés Perea for clarifying this point in a personal communication.
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Table 2: Rendezvous
At the breakfast table, Mary and Joe decide to go to a restaurant after work. They consider
Luigi’s Trattoria and Harry’s Sports Bar. Joe is in a hurry and asks Mary to reserve a table. After
Joe has left the room, Mary notices that they did not agree on a choice and now they have
absolutely no possibility of communicating with each other. Mary believes that Joe is a smart
guy. This means he will call a restaurant to ask whether she has made a reservation. Hence,
independent of her particular choice, he will always come to the right place.
say that the chosen strategies are, in any sense, stochastically independent. Hence, strategic
independence must be clearly distinguished from stochastic independence. Table 2 contains a
game in which the strategic-independence assumption is violated.
Aumann’s assumption shall be denoted by AUM := BAY ∧ INV. This looks as if we are going to
adopt the measure-theoretic, i.e., ex-post, point of view discussed in Section 1.1. The problem
is that we want to analyze the strategic behavior of the players and thus we must adopt the
decision-theoretic, i.e., ex-ante, point of view. If we adopt the ex-ante point of view for Player i ,
we cannot at the same time adopt the ex-post point of view for any player j 6= i . Put another way,
if we consider the strategies of the other players after they have made their decisions, Player i
has already made up his mind, too. This would not serve the purpose. Hence, Assumption AUM
implies that the strategies of the other players do not depend ex ante on the choice of Player i . In
the following, I always adopt the ex-ante point of view when I compare the available actions or
strategies of the players with each other. By contrast, if I consider the given solution of a game, I
adopt the ex-post point of view.
For the time being, we may suppose that Assumption AUM is satisfied. Hence, the solution of
the game, s∗ = (s∗1 , s∗2 , . . . , s∗n), must be such that
Ei
(
ui
(
s∗i , s
∗i ))≥ Ei (ui (si , s∗i )), ∀si , i = 1,2, . . . ,n .13
This solution is said to be a subjective correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1987, p. 14). Moreover,
Aumann (1987, p. 7) presumes that the players have a common prior, i.e., we have that pi (F )=
p j (F ) for all F ∈F and i , j = 1,2, . . . ,n. This fundamental assumption goes back to Harsanyi
(1967–1968). It implies that the posteriors of the players can differ only through their private
information—that is, their personal evidence. Otherwise, the deviations could also be due to
their individual beliefs, which are expressed by p1, p2, . . . , pn . We conclude that the solution of
the game, s∗, must be such that
E
(
ui
(
s∗i , s
∗i ))≥ E(ui (si , s∗i )), ∀si , i = 1,2, . . . ,n ,
where E(·) denotes the expectation of each player based on the common prior. This solution is
said to be a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1987, p. 4).
Common priors are indispensable if we want to guarantee that probabilistic statements
13Aumann (1987, p. 4) compares “ f := ( f 1, . . . , f n)” with “( f −i , g i ) := ( f 1, . . . , f i−1, g i , f i+1, . . . , f n).” Here f i denotes
the strategy of Player i and g i is a function of f i , i.e., the strategy g i must be σ(Ii )-measurable, too.
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Figure 1: State space and information partitions.
are independent of individual beliefs. Otherwise, statements like “Strategy s1 is stochastically
independent of Strategy s2” and “Player 1 chooses Action a1 with probability
1
2 ” can no longer be
made without specifying the underlying probability measure, i.e., the prior, of the corresponding
player. This means that if the priors are distinct, it is impossible to characterize the solution
of the game by a single profile distribution, i.e., a joint probability distribution of strategies.
Aumann (1987, p. 12) points out that “Common priors are explicit or implicit in the vast majority
of the differential information literature in economics and game theory.” For a broad overview
of the common-prior assumption in economics see Morris (1995).
Despite its wide acceptance in economics, the common-prior assumption is the subject of
controversial discussion (Aumann, 1998, Gul, 1998, Morris, 1995). Although Aumann generally
supports the common-prior assumption, in Aumann (1987, p. 12) he mentions that it “is not a
tautological consequence of the Bayesian approach.” In fact, Savage (1954, p. 3) points out that
his personalistic interpretation of probability does “not deny the possibility that two reasonable
individuals faced with the same evidence may have different degrees of confidence in the truth
of the same proposition.” Morris (1995) goes even further and argues that it makes little sense, on
the one hand, to allow for individual beliefs and, on the other hand, to impose the common-prior
assumption, which postulates that the beliefs of the players are equal. The following results do
not require the common-prior assumption. It is supposed only that the players agree about the
negligible events, i.e., that their priors are equivalent.
2. Strategic Certainty
2.1. A Simple Illustration
A strategic game is a subtle object. To avoid unnecessary complications, I suppose that there
are only two players. The state space of the game,Ω, is depicted in Figure 1. The event set,F ,
is the σ-algebra generated by the partition
{
I1∩ I2, I1∩ J2, J1∩ I2, J1∩ J2
}
ofΩ, and the private
information partitions of the players are given by I1 =
{
I1, J1
}
and I2 =
{
I2, J2
}
, respectively.
The players assign each element ofF—except for ;—a positive probability. Further, the action
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Frahm, 2016 • A Note on Bayesian Rationality and Correlated Equilibrium
3
2
4
3
2
4
3
1
4
2
3
1
4
2
Figure 2: Response diagrams for I1∩ I2.
sets correspond to A1 = A2 =R.
Suppose that some state ω ∈ I1∩ I2 ⊂Ω obtains. In this case, Player 1 knows that I1 happens,
whereas Player 2 knows that I2 happens. Assume that Player 1 decides to choose Action “3.”
His action implies a certain strategy of Player 2. The point is that, due to Assumption BAY, the
action of Player 1 uniquely determines the strategy of Player 2—except for the events that Player
1 considers negligible a posteriori. More precisely, it is assumed that Player 1 knows the response
of Player 2. For example, if Player 1 chooses “3,” Player 2 might choose “2” in case of ω ∈ I2 and
“1” if ω ∈ J2 obtains. Now, since ω ∈ I2 obtains, Player 2 decides to choose “2.” In the same way,
the choice of Player 2 must lead to a definite strategy of Player 1, which is known by Player 2.
Player 1 chooses “3” in case of ω ∈ I1 and, additionally, we can assume that he chooses “4” if
ω ∈ J1 obtains.
The players are Bayes rational and thus Action “3” must be an optimal choice for Player
1—provided he knows that the event I1 happens. This means there is no other action a1 ∈ R
whose (conditional) expected utility is greater than the expected utility of Action “3.” In general,
Player 1 would have to take into account the response of Player 2 that is associated with each
available action a1 ∈ A1. However, Assumption INV guarantees that Player 2 still chooses Action
“2” in case of ω ∈ I2 and “1” if ω ∈ J2 obtains, irrespective of whether Player 1 chooses Action “3”
or something other than “3” in case of ω ∈ I1. In short, Player 2 will not change his strategy if
Player 1 changes his action.
The problem is that Player 1 cannot choose any other action if Player 2 sticks with his choice.
We have already specified that Player 2 knows that Player 1 chooses Action “3” if ω ∈ I1 obtains,
given that Player 2 chooses Action “2” in case of ω ∈ I2. Now, if the state ω ∈ I1∩ I2 obtains, it
cannot happen that Player 1 chooses “3” and any other action, simultaneously. Hence, Player 1
is not able to move from “3” to anything else—if Player 2 adheres to Action “2.” Put another way,
if Player 1 moves from “3” to something else, then Player 2 must change his action as well and
thus Assumption INV is violated. The same arguments apply mutatis mutandis to Player 2.
The above arguments work only because we assume that each player knows the potential
reactions of the other player. In fact, the problem disappears instantly if we allow the conjectures
of the players to be incorrect. Then Player 2 is ignorant of whatever Player 1 actually does and
so Player 1 indeed can change his action unilaterally. However, as long as we assume that the
players know each other’s response, they cannot choose their actions independently.
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These conclusions could be elusive for some readers, so I would like to illustrate the logic
behind my arguments in Figure 2. Assumption BAY guarantees that each player has a response
function. We may focus, without loss of generality, on the actions that are chosen on the basis
of I1 ∈ I1 and I2 ∈ I2, respectively. The red line in the first diagram indicates the response
function of Player 1, i.e., the response of Player 2 to each possible action of Player 1. It implies
that Player 2 will not change his action, “2,” if Player 1 moves from “3” to “4.” By contrast, the
response function of Player 2 is given by the black line, which says that Player 1 will not change
his action, “3,” if Player 2 moves from “2” to anything else. Hence, the given response functions
reflect Assumption INV. In this case, Player 1 cannot move to “4.” This can be seen as follows: If
Player 1 moves to “4,” he knows that Player 2 chooses “2,” but then—according to the response
function of Player 2—Player 2 knows that Player 1 chooses “3.” This is a contradiction. The same
arguments apply to Player 2, i.e., he cannot choose anything other than “2.” In fact, the only
possible combination of actions is (3,2), i.e., the point of intersection. The problem with this
conclusion is twofold: (i) We have assumed that each player can choose an arbitrary element
of R and (ii) it makes no sense to restrict the players to a single action, since in this case the
question of rational choice becomes trivial.
We could try to resolve this problem by assuming that the black line, i.e., the response function
of Player 2, depends on the action of Player 1. More precisely, as is shown in the second diagram,
if Player 1 moves from “3” to “4,” the black line also moves from “3” to “4.” We can transfer
this principle to Player 2, i.e., if Player 2 moves from “2” to “1,” the same happens with the red
line—see the third diagram. If we allow for this possibility, each arbitrary combination of actions
within the product space A1× A2 =R2 is possible. However, in this case, the action of Player 2 is
not a function, in the proper mathematical sense, of the action of Player 1 and vice versa.14 This
means Assumption BAY is violated and so the given “response functions” become meaningless.
As mentioned above, a player can choose only an action that belongs to an intersection point.
Moreover, since we assume that both players are free to choose everything from R, the response
functions must be congruent and bijective in R2. In this case, each player can do whatever he
wants to do, but the choice of one player depends on the choice of the other. Put another way,
their actions are interconnected; i.e., if one player changes his action the other must change his
action, too. This is shown in the fourth diagram, where the green line represents the response
functions of both players. However, this is only one possible solution. We could also have chosen
any other bijection in R2. In any case, Assumption INV cannot be maintained if Assumption BAY
holds true. The following section elaborates the aforementioned insights in a more formal way.
2.2. The Coherence Principle
Throughout this section, it is implicitly assumed that n ∈N\ {1}. Thus, we deal with strategic
games. Further, it is supposed only that the priors p1, p2, . . . , pn are equivalent on the measurable
space (Ω,F ), i.e., we have that pi (F )= 0 if and only if p j (F )= 0 for all F ∈F and i , j = 1,2, . . . ,n.
This means the players agree about the negligible events. This assumption is satisfied if the
14More precisely, the action of Player 2 is not uniquely determined by the action of Player 1 and vice versa.
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players have a common prior and, indeed, if there exists an objective prior. Player i is said
to have imperfect information if and only if there exists a substantial event Ii ∈Ii such that
0< pi (I j | Ii )< 1 for some I j ∈Ij with j 6= i . Otherwise, he has perfect information.
The following results do not require any behavioral assumption. In particular, it is not assumed
that the players are (Bayes) rational unless otherwise stated.
Theorem 1. Assumption BAY precludes Assumption INV.
Proof: Since the priors are equivalent, the players share the same setN of null events. Consider
Player i and let Ii ∈Ii be some substantial event. Then, for every other player j 6= i , we can find
an event I j ∈Ij such that Ii ∩ I j ∈F \N , which implies that I j ∈F \N . Player i can choose
an arbitrary action a′i ∈ Ai on the basis of Ii . Suppose that Assumption BAY is satisfied. Hence,
the strategy of Player j is uniquely determined by a′i except for the pi (· | Ii )-null events. More
precisely, Player j chooses an action a j ∈ A j on the basis of I j . Since Player i considers Ii ∩ I j
substantial, he knows that Player j chooses a j if he chooses a′i . Due to the same arguments,
Player j knows that Player i chooses ai ∈ Ai if he chooses a j on the basis of I j . If we suppose
that ai 6= a′i , we obtain the contradiction a′i ⇒ a j ⇒ ai , i.e., Player i cannot choose a′i . We have
assumed that he is free to choose every element from Ai and thus we must have that ai = a′i .
Now, suppose that Player i knows that Player j still chooses a j if he chooses some action a′′i ∈ Ai
with a′′i 6= a′i . Then we obtain the contradiction a′′i ⇒ a j ⇒ ai = a′i , i.e., Player i cannot choose
a′′i . Hence, since Player i is free to choose anything from Ai , Player j cannot adhere to a j if
Player i chooses a′′i instead of a
′
i . We conclude that Assumption INV is violated. Q.E.D.
The proof of Theorem 1 reveals that the players cannot choose their strategies independently
if Assumption BAY is satisfied. The next theorem states that the Bayes condition is violated per
se if any player has imperfect information.
Theorem 2. In every strategic game with imperfect information, Assumption BAY is violated.
Proof: Since the priors are equivalent, the players share the same setN of null events. Assume
that Player i has imperfect information. This means there exists a substantial event Ii ∈Ii such
that Ii ∩ I j , Ii ∩ J j ∈F \N with I j , J j ∈Ij and I j 6= J j for some j 6= i . Suppose that Assumption
BAY is satisfied. Then every action that Player i chooses on the basis of Ii uniquely determines
the actions chosen by Player j both on I j and J j . Thus, if Player j adheres to his action on I j but
changes his action on J j , Player i must change his action on Ii , too. From Ii ∩ I j , Ii ∩ J j ∈F \N
we conclude that I j , J j ∈F \N . Assumption BAY implies that the action of Player i on Ii must
be uniquely determined by the action of Player j on I j . However, we have already concluded
that Player i changes his action on Ii if Player j sticks with his action on I j but changes his
action on J j . Hence, the action of Player i on Ii is not uniquely determined by the action of
Player j on I j and thus Assumption BAY is violated. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2 renders Bayesian rationality in games with imperfect information useless. The
problem is that Player i cannot predict the actions of Player j only by taking his action—based
on a substantial event Ii ∈Ii —into consideration. His action represents a (very small) part
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of his overall strategy, but the potential actions of Player j , i.e., his strategy, depends on the
overall strategy of Player i —not on the single action that he chooses on the basis of Ii . This
situation reminds us a bit of Angels & Demons (see Table 1). More precisely, Player i represents
the decision maker and Player j can be viewed as the omniscient being. By contrast, if the
players have perfect information, i.e., know each other’s reaction, we can apply Theorem 1. In
this case, the players cannot choose their strategies independently and thus every Bayes-rational
player has to take the responses of the others into account when maximizing his (conditional)
expected utility. This is demonstrated below by means of an example.
Theorem 2 only implies that Bayesian rationality cannot be used as a solution concept for
strategic games with imperfect information. Nonetheless, we must not conclude that our whole
model of strategic conflict becomes useless. Aumann’s subjectivistic approach requires only that
Player i knows the responses of the others to his own strategy. However, the strategies of the
others may depend on the strategy of Player i . More precisely, Player i has a unique conjecture,
Ψi (si ), about the responses of the other players to each strategy si and we make the following
additional assumption:
SAV. We have thatΨi (si )= si for each strategy si .
The fact that the conjecture of Player i is uniquely determined by his own strategy precisely
reflects the aforementioned idea that the state space,Ω, is properly specified. Assumption SAV
can be considered an unconditional version of Assumption BAY. Hence, according to Savage
(1954, p. 15), we assume that the decision maker, i.e., Player i , is never wrong. This assumption
is referred to as strategic certainty. Hence, each strategy si implies some response si . This may
be expressed in a more compact way as “si ⇒ si .”
In the remainder of this section, we shall analyze the question of whether we can maintain
Aumann’s model of strategic conflict without resorting to Bayesian rationality. The analogue to
Assumption INV reads as follows:
FIX. We have thatΨi (s′i )=Ψi (s′′i ) for all strategies s′i and s′′i .
Assumption SAV∧ FIX implies that the other players maintain their strategies if Player i changes
his strategy. This is nothing other than the strategic-independence assumption discussed in
Section 1.2. Under these circumstances the players could be considered rational—but not Bayes
rational—if and only if their strategies belong to a subjective correlated equilibrium. Moreover,
if the players have a common prior, the solution of the game must be a correlated equilibrium.
The next theorem denies the coexistence of Assumption SAV and Assumption FIX. This means
Assumption SAV ∧ FIX cannot be satisfied.
Theorem 3. Assumption SAV precludes Assumption FIX.
Proof: If Assumption SAV is satisfied, each strategy of Player i leads to one and only one strategy
of Player j . Suppose that Player i applies some strategy s′i and Player j responds with the strategy
s j . Analogously, the strategy of Player j , s j , leads to one and only one response, si , of Player i . If
we suppose that si 6= s′i we obtain the contradiction s′i ⇒ s j ⇒ si , i.e., Player i cannot apply s′i .
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Indeed, he can choose every σ(Ii )-measurable function fromΩ to Ai and so we must have that
si = s′i . Let Assumption FIX be satisfied, too. This means Player j maintains his strategy, s j , if
Player i moves from s′i to s
′′
i 6= s′i . Now, we obtain the contradiction s′′i ⇒ s j ⇒ si = s′i , i.e., Player
i is not able to apply s′′i . In fact, he is allowed to apply every strategy that can be constructed on
the basis of his private information partition and action set. We conclude that Assumption FIX
is violated. Q.E.D.
Hence, if Assumption SAV is satisfied, there exist two different strategies s′i and s
′′
i such that
Ψi (s′i ) 6=Ψi (s′′i ), where the conjecturesΨi (s′i ) andΨi (s′′i ) reflect the true responses of the other
players to the strategies s′i and s
′′
i of Player i . Hence, strategic certainty crowds out strategic
independence or, equivalently, strategic independence requires strategic uncertainty.
Now, we maintain Assumption SAV but drop Assumption FIX. This means we assume only
that the players do not suffer from strategic uncertainty. Player i considers
(
si ,Ψi (si )
)
a Savage
act. The set of all available Savage acts, i.e.,
Si :=
{(
si ,Ψi (si )
)
: si ∈ AΩi is σ(Ii )-measurable
}
,
is called the graph ofΨi . Since the priors are equivalent, the players share the same L0 space,
i.e., a player considers two strategies identical if and only if each other player considers the same
strategies identical.
LetΨi j (si ) be the conjecture of Player i about (the strategy of) Player j —given that Player i
applies the strategy si . The graph ofΨi j , i.e.,Si j , is the set of all 2-tuples
(
si ,Ψi j (si )
)
.
Proposition 1. If Assumption SAV is satisfied,Si j andS j i are congruent for i , j = 1,2, . . . ,n.
Proof: Suppose that Si j and S j i are incongruent for some i 6= j . Then there exists either a
strategy si such thatΨ j i
(
Ψi j (si )
) 6= si or a strategy s j such thatΨi j (Ψ j i (s j )) 6= s j . This means
either si would be unavailable to Player i or s j would be unavailable to Player j . Q.E.D.
We conclude thatS :=S1 =S2 = . . .=Sn . More precisely,S is the set of Savage acts that are
available to all players. The element ofS that is manifested—ex post—is said to be the solution
of the game. All strategy tuples outside S cannot manifest. However, the solution of a game
cannot be determined—ex ante—without making any behavioral assumption.
Theorem 4. Let Assumption SAV be satisfied. For all s, t ∈S with s 6= t we have that si 6= ti for
i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
Proof: Proposition 1 implies thatΨi j is bijective for i , j = 1,2, . . . ,n. This leads immediately to
the statement of the theorem. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4 says that if a player changes his strategy, each other player must change his strategy,
too. Hence, the players choose their strategies in a coherent way. This “coherence principle”
not only states that the strategic-independence assumption is violated in individual cases; it is
always violated under Assumption SAV. For this reason, we shall develop an appropriate notion
of rationality in games without strategic uncertainty.
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Definition 1 (Rational solution). A solution s ∈S is said to be rational if and only if Ei
(
ui (s)
)≥
Ei
(
ui (t )
)
for all t ∈S and i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
Hence, a rational solution is a Savage act that is optimal for all players. The set of rational
solutions shall be denoted byS ∗. In general, a rational solution is not a correlated equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Pareto efficiency). A solution s ∈S is said to be Pareto efficient if and only if there
is no t ∈S such that Ei
(
ui (t )
)> Ei (ui (s)) and E j (u j (t ))≥ E j (u j (s)) for each j 6= i .
Definition 3 (Uniqueness). The elements of a setR ⊆S are said to be essentially unique if and
only if Ei
(
ui (s)
)= Ei (ui (t )) for all s, t ∈R and i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
Theorem 5. Let Assumption SAV be satisfied. The rational solutions of a game are Pareto efficient
and essentially unique.
Proof: If s ∈S ∗ is not Pareto efficient, there exists some t ∈S such that Ei
(
ui (t )
)> Ei (ui (s)) and
E j
(
u j (t )
)≥ E j (u j (s)) for each player j 6= i . The first inequality implies that s cannot be a rational
solution. Now, suppose that s, t ∈S ∗ with Ei
(
ui (s)
) 6= Ei (ui (t )). Then either Ei (ui (s))< Ei (ui (t ))
or Ei
(
ui (s)
)> Ei (ui (t )). Thus, Player i can improve his expected utility by moving from s to t or
from t to s. This means either s or t cannot be a rational solution. Q.E.D.
In general we are not able to explain the way the solution of a strategic game takes place.
Nonetheless, if we assume that the players are rational, we can find the possible sets of available
Savage acts. The core idea can be illustrated this way: Suppose that we want to maximize some
arbitrary function ϕ :R2 →R over its first argument. We could search for some point x ∈R such
that ϕ(x, y) is maximal given that y ∈R is fixed, but this approach fails if y is an implicit function
of x, i.e., y = f (x). In this case, maximizing ϕ requires us to maximize ϕ(x, f (x)) over x. The two
arguments x and y may be interpreted as strategies in a 2-person normal-form game. Further,
the function ϕ represents the expected utility of Player 1 and f gives us the response of Player 2
to the strategy of Player 1, i.e., f is the response function of Player 1. Let φ be the expected utility
of Player 2 and g his response function. Due to Proposition 1 we have that g = f −1. This means
Player 2 has to maximize φ
(
f −1(y), y
)
over y , whereas Player 1 maximizes ϕ
(
x, f (x)
)
over x. A
rational solution is a point (x∗, y∗) ∈R2 that maximizes the expected utilities of both players, i.e.,
ϕ
(
x∗, f (x∗)
)≥ϕ(x, f (x)) and φ( f −1(y∗), y∗)≥φ( f −1(y), y)
for all x, y ∈ R. Hence, if the players are rational, only those response functions that lead to a
nonempty set of rational solutions can be possible. This might substantially restrict the set of
candidates for the response function f and so we can deduce a meaningful set of Savage acts.
This can easily be demonstrated by the prisoner’s dilemma (see Table 3). To make things
as easy as possible, we may assume that Ω = {0}, F = {;,Ω}, and I1 = I2 = {Ω}. Further,
the players possess the common action set A = {0,1}, where 0 means “deny” and 1 stands for
“confess.” This structure is very simple and reflects perfect information. Indeed, we could also
have chosen a more complicated model that allows for imperfect information, but this would
not have any substantial impact on our conclusions.
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Table 3: Prisoner’s Dilemma
Two gangsters have committed a crime and have been arrested. Apart from illegal possession
of arms, there is no evidence against them. Now, each prisoner can either deny or confess. If
both prisoners deny, they serve only one year in prison. If one player denies and the other
confesses, the latter is set free as a principal witness, whereas the former is sentenced to five
years. Moreover, if both players confess, each of them serves four years in prison.
Suppose that the prisoners are sitting together with their lawyer, who is instructed to announce
their testimonies in court. He asks the prisoners to make their choices. In this case, each player
is able to verify the strategy of the other. This means the players know the other’s response and
so they choose their strategies coherently. This can be explained in a more formal way as follows:
The players know everything that is determined byΩ and so they know the action of the other.
Hence, the action of Player 2 is uniquely determined by the action of Player 1 and vice versa. For
example, we could assume that Player 2 chooses Action 1 (“confess”) if Player 1 chooses Action 0
(“deny”). According to Theorem 4, there must be a one-to-one correspondence between their
actions. This means Player 1 must choose Action 0 if Player 2 chooses Action 1. Put another
way, we have that a1 = 0⇔ a2 = 1 and, equivalently, a1 = 1⇔ a2 = 0. If Player 1 is rational he will
choose a1 = 1⇒ a2 = 0, but then Player 2 cannot be rational, since otherwise he would choose
a2 = 1 ⇒ a1 = 0, etc. Hence, the given response functions do not lead to a rational solution.
This means we have thatS ∗ =;. By contrast, we could assume that a1 = 0⇔ a2 = 0 and thus
a1 = 1⇔ a2 = 1.15 Now, there exists a rational solution, i.e., both players deny. In fact, no player
has an incentive to defect, since everybody knows that the other player will then defect, too.16
Thus, we obtain a cooperative solution and not a correlated equilibrium.
Pareto efficiency and uniqueness are typical requirements in game theory (Colman, 2004).
Theorem 5 guarantees that these requirements are always satisfied. This is hardly surprising
if the players can be certain about each other’s response. Indeed, such a situation indicates
cooperative behavior. By contrast, noncooperative behavior requires strategic uncertainty.
3. Strategic Uncertainty
In most practical situations, players suffer from strategic uncertainty. This means they might
not know each other’s response. In the remainder of this note, I show that Aumann’s formal
approach can be applied to games with strategic uncertainty—after a slight but substantial
modification: I drop Assumption SAV, i.e., I do no longer assume that the conjectures of the
players are always correct. Hence, it might happen thatΨi (si ) 6= si for some strategy si .
Savage’s theory of rational choice in games against nature can be maintained if we allow the
decision maker to be wrong. This means he might not know the outcome of his decision if some
state of nature ω ∈Ω obtains, he must only believe that ω leads to a specific consequence s(ω).
We still assume that the state space,Ω, is properly specified. More precisely, the decision maker
15This behavior is called “tit for tat” (see, e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981).
16For this reason, “confess” does not dominate “deny.”
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has a unique conjecture about nature’s “response” to his strategy. Thus, he must be convinced
that the consequence s(ω) takes place if ω ∈Ω obtains, but his conjecture may be incorrect.
The same arguments can be applied to strategic games. We allow for strategic uncertainty
and so the coherence principle need no longer hold true. Hence, players might give arbitrary
responses to each other—according to their private information partitions and action sets. If a
player has perfect information, he need not know the action of another player. “Perfect” just
means that he is convinced about the actions of the other players. The point is that the player
himself cannot distinguish between “knowledge” and “conviction.” In general, this is possible
only for an outside observer. For this reason, our subjectivistic approach to rationality does not
require knowledge. This allows us to explain strategic behavior that can be observed in everyday
life in a very simple way.
Now, Player i is considered rational if and only if he applies a strategy si that leads to a Savage
act s = (si ,Ψi (si )) ∈Si such that Ei (ui (s))≥ Ei (ui (t )) for all t ∈Si . If Assumption FIX is satisfied,
we can substituteΨi (si ) by sii for notational convenience. In this case, the solution of the game,
s∗ = (s∗1 , s∗2 , . . . , s∗n), can be considered rational if and only if
Ei
(
ui
(
s∗i , s
i
i
))≥ Ei (ui (si , sii )), ∀si , i = 1,2, . . . ,n .
Moreover, if the players have a common prior, we can drop the index “i ” from “Ei .” Nonetheless,
the given solution is not a subjective correlated equilibrium—unless we have that sii = s∗i . This
means if each player is rational and the conjectures of all players are correct (for the given
solution s∗) we obtain a subjective correlated equilibrium. However, since the players may suffer
from strategic uncertainty, we refrain from making the additional assumptionΨi (s∗i )= s∗i . This
means the players can be rational although their conjectures about each other are incorrect.
Assumption FIX might be satisfied in most practical situations. Nonetheless, Rendezvous
(see Table 2) shows that there exist strategic games in which it is more natural for a player to
believe that the strategy of another player depends on his own strategy. Thus, it all depends on
the epistemic conditions we are trying to reproduce by our model of strategic conflict. However,
we do not have to explain how a rational player comes to his conclusions. We can simply take
his conjectures for granted—irrespective of their particular reasons.
For example, consider once again the prisoner’s dilemma, but now suppose that there is no
lawyer who represents the legal interests of the prisoners. We can still assume, for the sake of
simplicity, that the players act on the basis of Ω. This means they have perfect information.
Nonetheless, the players suffer from strategic uncertainty and so neither knows the action of the
other. This might appear counterintuitive to the reader. As already mentioned, “perfect” means
only that each player is convinced about the action of the other. However, their conjectures
may be incorrect. Communication would not solve the basic problem, namely that the players
are not able to verify the true intentions of the other—although they have perfect information.
Irrespective of whatever one makes the other believe, each player remains ignorant of what the
other is actually going to do. Hence, everybody can defect without consequences. This implies
that the players suffer from strategic uncertainty and we can readily justify Assumption FIX.
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Now, it is always best for the players to confess. This leads to the well-known noncooperative
solution of the prisoner’s dilemma. Only if both players foresee that the other is going to confess,
we obtain a correlated equilibrium. For example, we could explain such a solution by assuming
complete information and mutual knowledge of rationality. However, this goes beyond our
subjectivistic approach to rational choice. We do not require the conjectures of the players to be
correct—unless we want to drop the assumption of strategic uncertainty.
4. Conclusion
Aumann’s model is based on the assumption that strategic uncertainty can always be translated
into imperfect information and thus treated like uncertainty in a game against nature. Correlated
equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and
choose their strategies independently. We have seen that the Bayes condition is violated in every
game with imperfect information. Further, if the players have perfect information, the action of
a player always has an impact on the actions of the other players. More generally, if the players
do not suffer from strategic uncertainty, they choose their strategies in a coherent way. This
holds irrespective of whether the players are rational or not, but if they are rational, the solution
of the game is always Pareto efficient and essentially unique. Normally, since the players cannot
choose their strategies independently, it is not a correlated equilibrium.
Hence, strategic independence requires strategic uncertainty. In most practical situations,
players suffer from strategic uncertainty. Aumann’s formal approach can be applied to games
with strategic uncertainty if we allow the conjectures of the players to be incorrect. Each rational
player chooses a strategy that maximizes his subjective expected utility given his conjectures
about the other players. Nonetheless, even if the players are rational, have a common prior, and
choose their strategies independently, the given solution need not be a correlated equilibrium—
unless the conjectures of all players are correct in the particular case. Our subjectivistic approach
to rational choice under strategic uncertainty does not require such an additional assumption
and so the overall concept of equilibrium fades into the background.
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